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Effects of loan loss provisioning on lending behaviour of banks remain a major concern 
in policy circles in order to strenghten both bank stability and financial intermediation. A 
sample of 686 commercial banks in Asian countries over the 1992-2009 period is used to 
identify factors contributing to the occurence of a procyclical effect of loan loss 
provisions on loan growth. Our empirical results highlight that non-discretionary 
provisions have a procyclical effect, as higher non-discretionary provisions reduce loan 
growth of banks. This procyclical effect holds for large banks but not small banks. A 
closer investigation shows that bank market structure, economic development and 
institutional quality also affect the link between non-discretionary provisions and loan 
growth of banks. More specifically, higher bank competition, higher per capita income 
and higher rule of law mitigate the procyclical effect of non-discretionary provisions on 
loan growth regardless of whether banks are large or small. These findings have policy 
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During the last three decades, financial crises in both developed and developing 
countries were mostly preceded by strong macroeconomic performance that boosted risk 
taking and speculative bubbles, including the banking sector. Weak bank credit risk 
management during economic boom periods contributed to various financial turmoils; the 
1980 US saving and loan crisis, the 1994/1995 Mexican crisis, the 1997/1998 Asian 
crisis, the 1998 Russian crisis, and the 2008 credit crisis that led to a prolonged global 
economic downturn. Such crises again suggest the increasing needs for a sound credit 
risk management in banking that does not induce a procyclical effect. Banks tend to 
underestimate credit risks during cyclical upturns, but overestimate them during cyclical 
downturns These actions reduce loan availability and deepens economic recessions.  
Eventually, overcoming the procyclicality of bank credit risk management 
becomes one of the key issues in the new Basel accords, particularly related to bank 
capital regulation. Studies of banks’ procyclical behaviour have been conducted through 
two major channels. The first strand of literature focuses on the impact of 
macroeconomic fluctuation on banks’ capital buffer to examine whether capital buffer is 
procyclical over business cycles. In this regard, banks are substantially required to fulfill 
minimum capital adequacy ratios in order to cope with credit risk. Since capital 
requirements are based on risk, banks tend to increase capital buffer and reduce loans 
during a cyclical downturn due to banks’ risk-aversion. The second strand of literature 
explores the effect of macroeconomic fluctuation on bank loan loss provisions and how 
provisioning affects lending behaviour in banking.  
In spite of a growing literature focusing on the first strand (e.g. Ayuso et al, 2004; 
Borio et al, 2001, Jokipii and Milne, 2008; among others), very limited attention has been 
given to the second strand, particularly in the case of developing countries. The objective 
of this paper is, therefore, to extend previous literature on the procyclicality of bank loan 
loss provisions. Our contribution is twofold. First, we investigate the link between loan 
loss provisions and lending behaviour of banks in developing countries, focusing on 
Asian countries. Second, we examine several factors that may affect the impact of loan 
loss provisions on loan growth in banking. More specifically, we examine the influence 
of bank-specific and country-specific factors.  
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To the best of our knowledge, this paper is among the first to study  the link 
between loan loss provisions and loan growth of banks in an Asian context.
1
 There are 
three major reasons why Asian banking is considered. First, bank credit is the 
predominant source of financing for private sector businesses in Asia and, therefore, 
unsound credit risk management in banking can exacerbate financial disintermediation 
during a cyclical downturn (Adams, 2008; Angkomkliew et al., 2009). Second, interest 
conflicts between bank regulators and investors can also occur in Asian banks if banks 
only rely on loan loss reserves to deal with credit risks. Specifically, Agusman et al. 
(2009) document that higher loan loss reserves tend to reduce bank stock returns. Third, 
the loan loss provisioning system varies across Asian countries. While the procyclicality 
of loan loss provisions became a major issue after the 1997 crisis, there is still 
considerable debate regarding the implementation of the dynamic provisioning system.
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Therefore, this study is important because it contributes to the ongoing discourse on the 
implementation of the dynamic provisioning system in order to overcome the procyclical 
behaviour of Asian banks. This study also sheds light on bank-specific and country-
specific factors that may influence the effect of loan loss provisions on loan growth. 
Accordingly, this study allows us to determine conditions in which the adoption of the 
dynamic provisioning system is urgently required. 
Over the 1992-2009 period, we collect data for a sample of 686 commercial banks 
from 12 Asian countries that were affected by the 1997/1998 crisis. Following 
Soedarmono et al. (2011), who study Asian banks, such countries include China, Hong 
Kong, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Sri Lanka, South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, Pakistan, 
Philippines, and Vietnam.  
Empirical results from a dynamic panel data methodology show that higher bank 
loan loss provisions, particularly non-discretionary ones, reduce bank loan growth, 
highlighting the importance of the dynamic provisioning system for Asian banks. Such 
evidence is, however, dependent on bank-specific and country-specific factors. 
                                                 
1
  Only Bouvatier and Lepetit (2010) have studied the link between loan loss provisions and loan growth of 
banks in different group of countries including East Asian countries. However, they only examine the link 
in a general context and do not further assess whether such a relation is bank-specific or country-specific.   
2
  See Angklomkliew et al (2009) for further review on the current loan loss provisioning system in various 
Asian countries in order to respond the 1997/1998 crisis. Moreover, it is also shown that only a few 
countries have implemented a forward-looking provisioning system. 
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Specifically, such an effect disappears in small banks, while macroeconomic 
environments such as higher bank competition, higher economic development and better 
institutional quality can mitigate the negative effect of loan loss provisions on loan 
growth in all banks.  
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the existing 
literature on the use of loan loss provisions for bank credit risk management and its 
implications. Section 3 describes our data and methodology. Section 4 discusses 
empirical results and presents the robustness checks, while Section 5 concludes the paper.  
 
2. Literature review and research focus 
In order to overcome expected credit risk, banks mainly focus on the use of loan 
loss provisions as a prudential device. However, loan loss provisions can be procyclical 
with the business cycle as loans are likely to default during a cyclical downturn. This, in 
turn, increases banks’ risk aversion that boosts loan loss provisions (Altman, 2005).  
From an accounting perspective, there are two types of provisions for bank credit 
risk: specific and general provisions (Cortavaria et al., 2000). While specific provisions 
deal with identified impaired loans that increase loan loss reserves, general provisions are 
associated with a broad assessment of possible future losses on the entire bank portfolio. 
As banks must estimate general provisions, they might be influenced by subjective 
judgements related to managers’ discretionary behaviour.  
The literature documents that general provisions can be further partitioned into 
non-discretionary and discretionary components. On the one hand, non-discretionary 
provisions cover expected credit risks and are considered as a backward-looking 
component (Whalen, 1994; Beaver and Engel, 1996). On the other hand, the discretionary 
component is associated with the use of loan loss provisions for managerial objectives. 
Specifically, the discretionary component is linked to three discretionary actions 
consisting of capital management, income smoothing and signalling (Ahmed et al., 1999; 
Lobo and Yang, 2001). 
Moreover, the Basel definition of capital has emphasized that part of general 
provisions counts as capital. When loan losses are excessive during a cyclical downturn, 
increases in loan loss provisions can be inadequate to cover expected loan losses. Such 
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loan losses can erode bank capital and may, in turn, adversely affect banks’ incentive to 
grant new loans, exacerbating a cyclical downturn. This situation is often referred to as 
“capital crunch” and has been documented in the literature related to bank capital 
requirements (e.g. Bernanke and Lown, 1991; Peek and Rosengren, 1995).  
Likewise, previous studies have documented that the current bank provisioning 
system is, indeed, procyclical. Laeven and Majnoni (2003) point out that the 
procyclicality of loan loss provisions can have a negative impact of loan growth, 
economic growth or earnings. In a cross-country setting, Cavallo and Majnoni (2002) and 
Laeven and Majnoni (2003) find a negative link between economic growth and loan loss 
provisions. Similarly, Bikker and Metzemakers (2005) also document similar evidence 
for OECD countries. In a single country setting, Arpa et al. (2001) document the 
procyclicality of bank loan loss provisions over economic growth in Austria, while 
Fernandez de Lis et al. (2001) and Pain (2003) document similar results for Spanish and 
UK banks, respectively. Only Craig et al. (2006) and Angklomkliew et al. (2009) focus 
on Asian banks and, again, report identical results.  
In order to overcome the procyclicality of loan loss provisions, a sound 
provisioning system becomes essential in bank credit risk management and should be 
considered in any regulations on bank capital requirements (Cavallo and Majnoni, 2002; 
Banque de France, 2001). A sound provisioning system can avoid credit risk 
miscalculation in a cyclical downturn due to disaster myopia (Guttentag and Herring, 
1984), herd behaviour (Rajan, 1994), or institutional memory hypothesis (Berger and 
Udell, 2003).  
Fernandez de Lis et al. (2001) propose a dynamic or statistical provisioning 
system that may solve procyclicality issues. The statistical provisions are not addressed to 
substitute a specific provision but to complement the loan loss provisioning system. 
Specific and general provisions are built in line with the traditional procedure. 
Meanwhile, the statistical provisions are calculated from the difference between expected 
loan losses and specific provisions. The expected loan losses are computed using either a 
bank’s internal model or a standardized approach established by bank regulators. As the 
statistical provisions are built to anticipate risks due to business cycle fluctuations, the 
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statistical provisions tend to increase during a cyclical upturn in order to anticipate a 
cyclical downturn in the future.  
Although the statistical provisions also increase in a cyclical downturn, the funds 
obtained from “reserves” generated by the statistical provisions in the earlier period of 
economic boom can smooth bank profits and losses. This mechanism improves the 
measurement of bank profits and diminishes earnings volatility. The correlation between 
the non-discretionary component of loan loss provisions and loan fluctuations can be 
offset by the statistical provisions. Moreover, incorporating the statistical provisions into 
a bank provisioning system can mitigate banks’ incentive to grant new loans when 
expected credit risks are underestimated, particularly during a cyclical upturn.  
Borio et al. (2001), Mann and Michael (2002), and Jiménez and Saurina (2005) 
support Fernandez de Lis et al.’s (2001) contention that the procyclicality of bank loan 
provisions can be resolved, as long as banks can improve credit risk evaluation and profit 
management in their provisioning system. To investigate the importance of the dynamic 
provisioning system that takes into account the statistical provisions measurement, 
Bouvatier and Lepetit (2008) are the first to disentangle bank loan loss provisions into 
non-discretionary and discretionary provisions. They use European banks to analyze the 
implications on loan growth.. Non-discretionary provisions have a procyclical effect on 
loan growth in European banks. The adoption of the dynamic provisioning system 
incorporating the statistical provisions becomes necessary to offset shortcomings on non-
discretionary provisions.  
Nevertheless, each bank has different characteristics that may determine the 
effectiveness of the dynamic loan loss provisioning system. Similarly, each country also 
has different macroeconomic and institutional environments and, thus, the capacity of a 
country to adopt the dynamic provisioning system may vary. In spite of the importance of 
bank-specific and country-specific factors, there is no study that examines whether the 
implications on bank lending behaviour of the loan loss provisioning system are bank- or 
country-specific.  
This present study extends the previous literature by focusing specifically on 
Asian countries and by examining whether the link between non-discretionary provisions 
and loan growth in banking is bank- or country-specific. We follow the method used by 
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Bouvatier and Lepetit (2008) in differentiating discretionary and non-discretionary 
provisions, but we consider bank- and country-specific factors when examining the effect 
of both provisioning components on loan growth in banking. The bank-specific factor 
examined in this study focuses on bank asset size, while country-specific factors include 
bank market structure, economic development and institutional quality.  
Bank asset size is an important dimension in bank credit risk management 
because large banks are more prone to be “too big to fail” and to have moral hazard 
problems (Mishkin, 2006; Kane, 2000). During economic boom periods, large banks are 
less likely to increase loan loss provisions to anticipate unexpected credit risk because 
they believe that the government will rescue them in case of failure. Consequently, non-
discretionary provisions that only increase in response to higher non-performing loans 
during a cyclical downturn, may, in turn, adversely affect lending activities in large 
banks.   
With regard to macreconomic environments, financial crises that have been 
preceded by lending booms provide an important insight regarding the role of bank 
market structure. According to Ogura (2006), bank competition for borrowers may boost 
loans because competing banks tend to underprice their lending rate and thus, credit risks 
are underestimated. Therefore, the relation between loan loss provisions and loan growth 
of banks can be dependent on bank market structure. Moreover, Goddard et al. (2011) 
show that banks in developing countries, such as the Asian and Sub-Saharan African 
countries, have weaker profit persistence than banks in developed countries in Western 
Europe and North America. In this regard, the level of economic development can affect 
the procyclical effect of loan loss provisions on loan growth of banks through the 
earnings management channel. Banks in environments with higher levels of economic 
development could be less prone to procyclicality because they can smooth earnings 
volatility due to the dynamism of the economy. Finally, we consider the role played by 
institutional quality related to shareholders’ protection. Higher institutional quality is 
more likely to mitigate the procyclical effect of bank loan loss provisions on bank loan 
growth during a cyclical downturn. Prior empirical literature also document that strong 
institutional development can empower investors to enforce and monitor their contracts, 
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which, in turn, positively affect economic development along with higher loan 
availability (Haselmann et al., 2010).  
 
3. Data and methodology 
3.1. Data source  
From BankScope Fitch IBCA, we initially construct an unbalanced panel of 
annual bank-level data from 686 commercial banks in 12 countries in Asia covering the 
1992- 2009 period. These countries include China, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Sri Lanka, South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, Pakistan, Philippines, and Vietnam. 
Moreover, we incorporate country-specific data such as real gross domestic product, 
lending rate and inflation rate, retrieved from the International Financial Statistics. We 
further incorporate country-level data from the Financial Structure Database established 
by Beck and Demirguc-Kunt (2009), as well as country-level data on institutional quality 
that come from Kaufmann et al (2010).  
 
3.2. Methodology 
As stated earlier, the objective of this study is twofold. First, we examine the link 
between loan loss provisions and loan growth in banking by differentiating discretionary 
and non-discretionary provisions. Second, we examine whether bank-specific and 
country-specific factors affect the link. For such purposes, estimations are conducted in 
four stages. 
In the first stage, we model the determinants of bank loan loss provisions. In order 
to closely examine bank-specific factors associated with asset size, we consider three 
models according to: (1) all banks, (2) large banks, and (3) small banks.
3
  
In the second stage, we estimate discretionary provisions and non-discretionary 
provisions from the three models established in the first stage. Thus, we obtain three pairs 
of the loan loss provision components (discretionary and non-discretionary provisions). 
Each pair represents discretionary and non-discretionary provisions estimated within each 
                                                 
3
  We define large banks as banks with total assets greater than US$ 1 billion, while small banks are 
banks with total assets less than US$ 1 billion.  
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bank sample. Phrased differently, each bank sample has different values for discretionary 
and non-discretionary provisions. 
In the third stage, we examine the effect of loan loss provisions, particularly non-
discretionary ones, on bank loan growth. Again, we conduct analyses with respect to the 
three different bank samples. As a result, we can determine whether the effect of non-
discretionary provisions on loan growth in large banks is similar to that in small banks. 
In the fourth stage, we repeat the third stage, but we now incorporate country-
specific variables and their interaction terms with non-discretionary provisions. Country-
specific variables introduced in this stage are bank market structure, economic 
development and institutional quality.  
 
3.2.1. The determinant of bank loan loss provisions 
In the first stage, we establish the loan loss provisions equation in which the ratio 
of loan loss provisions to total loans (LLP) is used as the dependent variable. The loan 
loss provisions consist of two components; non-discretionary and discretionary.  
To capture the non-discretionary component, we use several indicators. Following 
Ahmed et al. (1999) and Bouvatier and Lepetit (2008), we consider the ratio of non-
performing loans to total loans (NPL). In addition, we incorporate the actual changes in 
the ratio of non-performing loans to total loans (DNPL). Specifically, DNPL is defined as 
follows:  tititi NPLNPLDNPL ,1,,   . Both of these measures are expected to 
positively affect bank loan loss provisions, since these provisions are used to cover 
expected credit risks. We also include the ratio of total loans to total assets (LOAN) as 
another non-discretionary component. The variable LOAN is expected to have a positive 
relation with the loan loss provisions, since loan portfolios are one of the sources of bank 
credit risk. As bank loss provisions can be procyclical with the business cycle, we also 
incorporate the growth rate of real per capita gross domestic product (GDPG). A negative 
coefficientindicates that LLP is procyclical, while a positive sign indicates that LLP is 
counter-cyclical with the business cycle. 
With respect to the discretionary component of LLP, we employ three measures to 
capture capital management, income smoothing and signalling hypotheses. To capture the 
capital management hypothesis, we follow Bikker and Metzemakers (2005) using the 
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ratio of total equity to total assets. To assess the income-smoothing hypothesis, we follow 
Anandarajan et al. (2006) using the ratio of earning before taxes and loan loss provisions 
to total assets (EBT). Finally, to assess the signalling hypothesis, we use the one-year-
ahead change in the ratio of earnings before taxes and loan loss provisions to total assets 
(SIGN), following Anandarajan et al. (2006) and Bouvatier and Lepetit (2008). 
Specifically, SIGN is defined as follows 
   tititititi TATAERERSIGN ,1,,1,, 5.0     
ER is earning before tax and loan loss provisions, while TA is total assets. 
In order to account for different macroeconomic environments, we incorporate the 
real gross domestic product growth rate (GDPG) in the loan loss provisions equation. 
GDPG is the heart of the procyclicality of bank loan loss provisions. If bank loan loss 
provisions are procyclical, we should observe a negative relationship between GDPG and 
the loan loss provision measures. We also include the one year-lagged LLP as one of the 
explanatory variables in order to take into account the dynamic adjustment of LLP.  
Based on the above discussion, the general model for the first stage regression for 












      (1) 
All bank-level data for variables used in Equation (1) are retrieved from BankScope Fitch 
IBCA, while all macroeconomic data come from the International Financial Statistics 
(IFS) database established by the International Monetary Fund.  
Again, it is important to note that we estimate Equation (1) with respect to three 
different bank samples (all banks, large banks, and small banks). Therefore, the 
regression equation constructed from Equation (1) differs across different bank samples. 
 
3.2.2. Computing discretionary and non-discretionary provisions 
In the second stage, we compute the estimated value of discretionary and non-
discretionary provisions based on Equation (1). More specifically, discretionary 
provisions (DISC) are estimated using the following equation 
titititi SIGNEBTCAPDISC ,7,6,5,              (2) 
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                (3) 
As we estimate Equation (1) based on three different bank samples, we obtain values of 
DISC and NDISC for all banks, large banks and small banks. 
 
3.2.3. The effect of loan loss provisions on loan growth of banks  
 In the third stage, we assess the effect of bank loan loss provisions for both non-
discretionary and discretionary provisions on bank loan growth. Following Bouvatier and 
Lepetit (2008), bank loan growth (DLOAN) is defined as the actual change in the ratio of 
total loans to total assets. More precisely, bank loan growth is assessed by 
   1,,1,,, 5.0   tititititi TATALLDLOAN  
L is defined as total loans. Next, we examine several explanatory variables that may 
affect DLOAN. First, we incorporate the non-discretionary component of loan loss 
provisions (NDISC). NDISC is a linear combination from DNPL, NPL, LOAN, and 
GDPG whose coefficients are estimated using Equation (1). Second, we include the 
discretionary component of loan loss provisions (DISC) as an explanatory variable in the 
bank loan growth equation. DISC is the linear combination from CAP, EBT and SIGN 
whose coefficients are also computed from Equation (1).  
 To control for bank-specific variables, we include the capital adequacy ratio 
(CAP) as used in Equation (1) and the growth rate of deposits (DDEPO). Following 
Lepetit et al. (2008), DDEPO is defined as follows:  
   1,,1,,, 5.0   tititititi TATADDDDEPO  
D represents total deposits. Moreover, we incorporate several variables to control for the 
macroeconomic environment that may influence DLOAN, such as the growth rate of real 
per capita gross domestic product (GDPG), the lending rate (LRATE) and the inflation 
rate (INF). LRATE and INF data are retrieved from the IFS database. The one year-lagged 
DLOAN is also included as an explanatory variable because loan growth at time t can be 
influenced by loan growth in the earlier period. Accordingly, the general model for the 












          (4) 
To this end, it is important to note that Equation (4) is also estimated with respect 
to three different bank samples. In terms of econometric methodology, we apply a 
dynamic panel data model using the two-step Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) 
estimator following Blundell and Bond (1998) with Windmeijer’s (2005) finite sample 
correction. In this study, a dynamic panel data analysis is intuitively more accurate than a 
static panel data analysis with fixed/random effects because bank loan loss provisions and 
loan growth vary over time and their value at time t is more likely to be influenced by 
their value at time 1t .  
The two-step GMM estimators are valid when they fulfill two conditions. First, 
there is no second-order serial correlation between residual terms of the first-differenced 
equation. Second, the over-identifying restrictions of instruments are valid. More 
specifically, the model is valid when the AR (2) test and the Hansen-J test are both 
insignificant. To account for robustness, we implement the orthogonal deviations 
transformation of instruments, which account for bank-level fixed effects, and the first 
difference transformation of instruments which do not. Both transformations are applied 
to estimate Equation (1) and (4) with respect to the three different bank samples.  
It is crucial to highlight that Equation (1) and (4) above should be estimated 
consistently using the similar method with respect to three different bank samples. For 
example, within each bank sample, when we consider the orthogonal transformation of 
instruments in Equation (1), then Equation (4) should also be estimated by considering 
the orthogonal transformation of instruments. The similar approach is implemented when 
we consider the first difference transformation of instruments.   
 
3.2.4. The role of country-specific environments 
 In order to examine whether the link between non-discretionary provisions and 
loan growth at banks is dependent on country-specific factors, we incorporate an 

















        (5) 
CS represents the three measures of country-specific factors. These include the ratio of 
total assets of the three largest banks over the total assets of the banking system (CR3) to 
account for bank market structure. These data come from Beck and Demirguc-Kunt 
(2009). We also consider the influence of economic development measured by the real 
per capita GDP (GDPCAP), which is retrieved from the IFS database. Finally, we 
incorporate the rule of law index (RLAW) to account for institutional quality. RLAW is 
retrieved from Kaufman et al (2010).  
 
4. Empirical results 
4.1. Descriptive statistics 
 Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics of all variables used in this study. All 
variables are also grouped based on bank sample categories. From the descriptive 
statistics, small banks exhibit higher non-performing loans (NPL) and higher actual 
change in non-performing loans (DNPL) than large banks and, thus, small banks hold 
higher loan loss provisions than large banks. Differentiating banks with respect to their 
asset size can highlight that banks use loan loss provisions for non-discretionary 
purposes. In terms of discretionary purpose, small banks hold higher EQTA, higher SIGN, 
but lower EBT than large banks. As small banks have higher LLP than large banks, this 
may again highlight that small banks use LLP for capital management and signalling 
purposes, but it is less likely for income smoothing purposes. These initial observations 
highlight differences between small banks and large banks. Differentiating large banks 
and small banks is thus necessary in this regard. 
 






4.2. Regression results 
4.2.1. The determinants of bank loan loss provisions 
In the first stage, we estimate Equation (1) to obtain coefficients related to the 
non-discretionary and discretionary components of loan loss provisions. Table 2 reports 
our estimation outputs. 
  
[Insert Table 2 here] 
 
From Table 2, we show that CAP and SIGN are positively linked to LLP. This 
suggests that Asian banks use loan loss provisions for the capital management and 
signalling discretionary purposes. Meanwhile, EBT is negatively linked to LLP, 
suggesting that Asian banks do not use loan loss provisions for income smoothing 
purposes. These results are consistent across different bank samples regardless of whether 
we use the orthogonal transformation or the first difference transformation of 
instruments.  
We also document that higher NPL results in higher LLP as expected. This 
indicates that Asian banks use LLP for non-discretionary purposes; they are required to 
increase provisions when impaired loans are observed. This result is similar across all 
three bank samples regardless of the transformation method of instruments used. 
However, LOAN does not influence bank loan loss provisioning decisions across the 
three different bank samples. Furthermore, DNPL only positively affects loan loss 
provisions in small banks. In this case, the use of loan loss provisions for non-
discretionary purposes is more pronounced in small banks than large banks, because the 
coefficients of NPL and DNPL are only significant in the small bank sample. With regard 
to the business cycle, only small banks exhibit a positive relation between GDPG and 
LLP. This highlights that the LLP in small banks is counter-cyclical with the business 
cycle. The fact that LLP is counter-cyclical in small banks this suggests that small banks 
are more forward-looking than large banks and, therefore, we expect that non-
discretionary provisions in small banks do not exacerbate lending activities. Next, we 
examine whether this argument is correct. 
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4.2.2. The impact of loan loss provisions on loan growth of banks 
 In this stage, we assess the effect of discretionary and non-discretionary 
provisions on loan growth of banks. Table 3 reports our estimation results.  
 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
 
Table 3 shows that in the all bank sample, there is a negative link between NDISC 
and DLOAN suggesting that non-discretionary provisions tend to reduce loan growth of 
banks. This is because during economic boom periods, weak specific provisions increase 
banks’ incentives to expand credit activities. However, such behaviour does not allow 
banks to anticipate a cyclical downturn, so that banks tend to build loan loss provisions 
when impaired losses are identified. In turn, such banks reduce loan supply (Bouvatier 
and Lepetit, 2008). Although there is also a negative and significant relation between 
DISC and DLOAN, discretionary provisions are not part of regulatory objectives that aim 
to improve bank credit risk management through non-discretionary provisions.  
 Interestingly, there is no significant relation between NDISC and DLOAN in small 
banks regardless of whether we use either the orthogonal deviations or first-difference 
transformation of instruments. These findings are consistent with those obtained from 
Table 2. As LLP in small banks is counter-cyclical with the business cycle as shown in 
Table 2, higher NDISC in turn does not affect loan growth of small banks as shown in 
Table 3.  
 From these findings, we conclude that the adoption of the dynamic provisioning 
system to solve banks’ procyclical behaviour is more crucial in large banks than in small 
banks. However, we do not discourage small banks from adopting the dynamic 
provisioning system, as it is well accepted that the this system can overcome the 
procyclical effect of loan loss provisions, which may, in turn, exacerbate loan 
fluctuations. 
 
4.2.3. Does market structure, economic development and the rule of law matter? 
In the final stage, we examine whether country-specific environments can 
mitigate the procyclical effect of loan loss provisions on loan growth of banks. Table 4, 
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Table 5 and Table 6 document our findings when we examine the influence of bank 
market structure (CR3), economic development (GDPCAP) and institutional 
development (RLAW), respectively. 
From Table 4, it is shown that the relation between non-discretionary provisions 
(NDISC) and loan growth of banks (DLOAN) is dependent on bank market structure 
(CR3). Non-discretionary provisions of banks in highly concentrated markets 
(CR3*NDISC) generally do not exhibit a significant impact on bank loan growth 
(DLOAN). This result is robust to the use of orthogonal deviations and first-difference 
transformations of instruments, but only holds for the small bank sample.  
 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
 
However, the influence of CR3 remains unclear for small banks due to the fact 
that the link between NDISC and DLOAN is insignificant in the small bank sample as 
shown in Table 3. For large banks, the link between CR3*NDISC and DLOAN is 
negative, suggesting that higher non-discretionary provisions of large banks reduces loan 
growth only in countries with less competitive banking markets. Accordingly, it is higher 
bank competition that may mitigate the negative effect of non-discretionary provisions on 
loan growth of large banks.  
In Table 5, we show that there is no significant impact of the interaction term 
NDISC*GDPCAP on bank loan growth (DLOAN). This result is again consistent in all 
samples. Higher economic development permits banks to enhance their profit persistence 
(e.g., Goddard et al., 2011), which could be useful whenever banks are required to 
increase their loan loss provisions without necessarily reducing loan availability.    
 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
Finally, we incorporate the interaction term NDISC*RLAW in order to examine 
whether the impact on loan growth of non-discretionary provisions is dependent on the 
quality of the rule of law as a proxy of institutional development. In all three samples, the 
impact of NDSIC on DLOAN is dependent on the quality of the rule of law. The link 
between NDISC and DLOAN is no longer significant, as the quality of the rule of law is 
 17 
improved. Better rule of law thus empowers investors to enforce and monitor their 
contracts, while banks in a better institutional environment are willing to increase loan 
availability because of the enhanced contracts and governance from the firms.  
 
[Insert Table 6 here] 
 
4.3. Robustness checks 
           We conduct some modifications in estimating all equations presented above in 
order to ensure robustness.
4
 First, we remove the time dummies in estimating Equation 
(1), (4) and (5), but the results discussed above are consistent. Second, we modify the 
method in estimating Equation (1), (4) and (5) by applying the Ordinary Least Squares 
(OLS) methodology. Using this method, our results regarding the impact on bank loan 
growth (DLOAN) of DISC, NDISC and their interaction terms with country-specific 
factors remains unaltered.  
 
5. Conclusions 
Using a sample of 686 commercial banks from 12 Asian countries over the 1992-
2009 period, this study aims to highlight the effect of loan loss provisions on lending 
behaviour of banks by investigating whether the effect is bank- or country-specific. In 
general, we show that Asian banks use loan loss provisions for both discretionary and 
non-discretionary purposes. In terms of discretionary purposes, Asian banks, regardless 
of whether they are small or large, use loan loss provisions for capital management and 
signalling purposes, but not for income smoothing. Asian banks also use loan loss 
provisions for non-discretionary purposes, and small banks exhibit a more forward-
looking behaviour than large banks. Specifically, only loan loss provisions in small banks 
are counter-cyclical with the business cycle.  
Although we document that non-discretionary provisions are generally associated 
with slower bank loan growth, only large banks exhibit a negative relationship between 
non-discretionary provisions and loan growth., This relation  not significant in small 
banks, confirming  the forward-looking behaviour of small banks. The dynamic 
                                                 
4
  The results of robustness checks are not presented in the paper, but are available on request. 
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provisioning system implementation is therefore more crucial in large banks than small 
banks. While our study suggests loan loss provisions in small banks are less responsive to 
the dynamism of the economy, we do not discourage small banks from implementing a 
dynamic provisioning system. It is clear that the specific provisions obtained by the 
dynamic provisioning system can mitigate procyclical effects of loan loss provisions on 
loan growth in banking, particularly during a cyclical downturn.  
 In addition, we examine whether the procyclical effect of non-discretionary 
provisions on loan growth of banks is country-specific. We find that country-specific 
environments, such as bank market structure, economic development and institutional 
quality affect the relation between non-discretionary provisions and loan growth of 
banks. More specifically, banks in countries with more competitive banking markets, 
higher per capita income and better rule of law do not exhibit a significant relation 
between non-discretionary provisions and loan growth of banks. Similarly, although we 
show that higher bank competition, higher per capita income and better institutional 
quality help mitigate the negative effect of non-discretionary provisions on loan growth 
of banks, it does not mean that the dynamic provisioning system implementation is 
unnecessary.  
Overall, this study identifies conditions in which the dynamic provisioning system 
is urgently required to solve the procyclical behaviour of banks. This study is important 
in the sense that Asian banks do not have similar capacity in implementing the dynamic 
provisioning system. Similarly, the procyclical effect of loan loss provisions, notably the 
non-discretionary ones, varies from country to country. Each country may have different 
macroeconomic environments, which, in turn, may determine the effectiveness of the 
dynamic provisioning system.   
Our findings suggest that bank regulators need to pay closer attention to the large 
banks with respect to the dynamic provisioning system implementation because non-
discretionary provisions in large banks reduce loan growth. A more in depth investigation 
at the country level  suggests that banks in countries with higher bank competition, higher 
per capita income and better rule of law seem less responsive to the dynamism of the 
economy because their non-discretionary provisions do not affect loan growth. Banks in 
these kinds of macroeconomic environments are the ones that do not urgently require the 
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dynamic provisioning system to overcome their procyclical behaviour, although its 
implementation is worth considering and remains encouraged.  
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics. LLP is the ratio of loan loss provisions to total loans. DNPL is the actual 
changes of non-performing loans. NPL is the ratio of non-performing loans to total loans. LOAN is the ratio 
of total loans to total assets. EQTA is the ratio of total equity to total assets. EBT is the ratio of earning 
before taxes and loan loss provisions to total assets. SIGN is the one-year-ahead change in the ratio of 
earnings before taxes and loan loss provisions to total assets. DDEPO is the actual change in the ratio of 
total deposits to total assets. DLOAN is the actual change in the ratio of total loans to total assets. LRATE is 
the lending rate. GDPG is the growth rate of real gross domestic product per capita. CR3 is the ratio of the 
three largest banks’ total assets to the total assets of banking system. GDPCAP is the real gross domestic 
product per capita. RLAW is the rule of law index coming from Kaufman et al (2010). 
 
  Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
      
All banks LLP 0.019337 0.051427 0.000014 0.948693 
 DNPL 0.002483 0.055734 -0.864169 0.897727 
 NPL 0.029218 0.066983 0.000000 0.897727 
 LOAN 0.540530 0.180878 0.000014 0.995843 
 EQTA 0.114508 0.117799 0.000228 0.998759 
 EBT 0.009571 0.010324 -0.037170 0.040186 
 SIGN 0.139823 0.931745 -6.899410 6.988115 
 DDEPO 0.097620 0.194437 -1.138423 1.569936 
 DLOAN 0.0670373 0.4585605 -1.968385 2 
Large banks LLP 0.0161988 0.0417287 0.0000136 0.9486932 
 DNPL 0.0015089 0.0490697 -0.8641686 0.8612003 
 NPL 0.026974 0.0585445 0.00001 0.8728127 
 LOAN 0.5519733 0.1547116 0.0001318 0.9958427 
 EQTA 0.0823526 0.0724849 0.0003872 0.9286116 
 EBT 0.0084545 0.0096027 -0.03717 0.0395615 
 SIGN 0.132755 0.8394387 -6.776203 6.988115 
 DDEPO 0.0981645 0.1561292 -0.7715145 1.081804 
 DLOAN 0.0738072 0.3993102 -1.968385 2 
Small banks LLP 0.0244974 0.0639474 0.0000204 0.8145833 
 DNPL 0.0039840 0.0646635 -0.6578521 0.8977273 
 NPL 0.0325267 0.0776665 0.0000367 0.8977273 
 LOAN 0.5234013 0.2130354 0.0000135 0.9884074 
 EQTA 0.1614855 0.1508696 0.0002281 0.9987589 
 EBT 0.0113557 0.0111546 -0.0365840 0.0401856 
 SIGN 0.1520755 1.0732450 -6.8994100 5.4530140 
 DDEPO 0.0967666 0.2426346 -1.1384230 1.5699360 
 DLOAN 0.0576136 0.5300531 -1.88572 1.920699 
Macro 
variables LRATE 0.113164 0.540753 0.050000 0.321800 
 GDPG 0.055143 0.033925 -0.131270 0.141950 
 INF 0.060674 0.059013 -0.039470 0.580200 
 CR3 0.517968 0.168919 0.247780 1.000000 
 GDPCAP 5876.785 8808.355 144.149 32000 
  RLAW 0.129311 0.649938 -1.000616 1.575986 
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Table 2. The determinants of bank loan loss provisions. The definition of variables follows the one presented in Table 1. LLP(-1) is the one-year lagged value 
of the ratio of loan loss provisions to total loans. The estimations are conducted using the two-step Generalized Method of Moments estimators. The models are 




 All Banks Large Banks Small Banks 
 Orthogonal Deviation First Difference Orthogonal Deviation First Difference Orthogonal Deviation First Difference 
  LLP LLP LLP LLP LLP LLP 
Expl. Variables       
LLP(-1) 0.138*** 0.137*** 0.226*** 0.1865*** 0.119*** 0.117*** 
 (0.0372) (0.0429) (0.0713) (0.066) (0.0424) (0.0408) 
DNPL 0.0451 0.0330 0.00786 0.0098 0.0682* 0.0473 
 (0.0279) (0.0220) (0.0373) (0.033) (0.0394) (0.0300) 
NPL 0.0667*** 0.0666*** 0.0810*** 0.0776*** 0.0543** 0.0562** 
 (0.0197) (0.0230) (0.0226) (0.023) (0.0233) (0.0282) 
LOAN 0.000986 0.000663 -0.00166 0.0015 0.00942 0.000242 
 (0.00492) (0.00549) (0.00493) (0.005) (0.00767) (0.00800) 
GDPG 0.0312 0.0278 0.00171 0.0105 0.0758*** 0.0843** 
 (0.0196) (0.0179) (0.0245) (0.023) (0.0278) (0.0346) 
EQTA 0.114*** 0.113*** 0.126*** 0.1114*** 0.0731** 0.0790*** 
 (0.0321) (0.0344) (0.0460) (0.042) (0.0323) (0.0250) 
EBT -0.526*** -0.501*** -0.336** -0.4088** -0.840*** -0.529*** 
 (0.170) (0.178) (0.165) (0.177) (0.206) (0.200) 
SIGN 0.00250** 0.00297** 0.00335** 0.0032** 0.00161 0.00290** 
 (0.00105) (0.00117) (0.00153) (0.002) (0.00122) (0.00140) 
         
p-value for AR(2) test 0.284 0.100 0.387 0.368 0.272 0.100 
p-value for Hansen-J test 0.973 0.993 0.980 0.992 0.897 0.915 
Observations 3,202 3,202 2,196 2,196 1,006 1,006 
Number of banks 571 571 318 318 253 253 
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Table 3. The effect of discretionary and non-discretionary provisions on loan growth of banks.  The definition of variables follows the one presented in 
Table 1. DLOAN(-1) is the one-year lagged value of DLOAN. DISC and NDISC is discretionary and non-discretionary provisions, respectively, which are 
estimated with respect to the method of transformations of instruments used: Orthogonal Deviations or First Difference. The estimations are conducted using the 
two-step Generalized Method of Moments estimators. The models are valid if the AR(2) test and Hansen-J test are both insignificant. 
 
  All Banks Large Banks Small Banks 
 Orthogonal Deviation First Difference Orthogonal Deviation First Difference Orthogonal Deviation First Difference 
  DLOAN DLOAN DLOAN DLOAN DLOAN DLOAN 
Expl. Variables       
DLOAN(-1) 0.02608*** 0.03546*** 0.0167* 0.0216** 0.0321** 0.0366*** 
 (0.009) (0.008) (0.00893) (0.010) (0.014) (0.013) 
DISC -3.41867*** -3.44678*** -1.313** -1.4251*** -3.4056*** -3.6942*** 
 (0.636) (0.614) (0.574) (0.525) (0.724) (0.932) 
NDISC -1.08944** -1.40460** -1.457*** -1.4231** 0.5243 -1.2048 
 (0.452) (0.552) (0.435) (0.549) (0.530) (0.735) 
EQTA 0.39341*** 0.38388*** 0.385*** 0.3967*** 0.1553** 0.2058*** 
 (0.073) (0.068) (0.100) (0.093) (0.064) (0.076) 
DDEPO 0.49652*** 0.47515*** 0.500*** 0.4854*** 0.5018*** 0.4802*** 
 (0.023) (0.025) (0.0299) (0.033) (0.033) (0.037) 
GDPG 0.37738*** 0.40280*** 0.197*** 0.2786*** 0.5407*** 0.7263*** 
 (0.057) (0.059) (0.0552) (0.059) (0.143) (0.147) 
LRATE -0.00170*** -0.00160*** -0.000522 -0.0008 -0.0039*** -0.0029*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.000599) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
INF 0.18356*** 0.24645*** 0.127*** 0.1572*** 0.2645*** 0.3314*** 
 (0.046) (0.046) (0.0390) (0.041) (0.078) (0.087) 
       
p-value for AR(2) test 0.098 0.111 0.261 0.312 0.231 0.225 
p-value for Hansen-J test 0.325 0.385 0.975 0.982 0.979 0.971 
Observations 2,634 2,634 1,689 1,689 945 945 
Number of banks 498 498 264 264 234 234 
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Table 4. The role of bank concentration on the link between non-discretionary provisions and loan growth of banks.  The definition of variables follows 
the one presented in Table 1. DLOAN(-1) is the one-year lagged value of DLOAN. DISC and NDISC is discretionary and non-discretionary provisions, 
respectively, which are estimated with respect to the method of transformations of instruments used: Orthogonal Deviations or First Difference. The estimations 
are conducted using the two-step Generalized Method of Moments estimators. The models are valid if the AR(2) test and Hansen-J test are both insignificant. 
 
  All Banks Large Banks Small Banks 
 Orthogonal Deviation First Difference Orthogonal Deviation First Difference Orthogonal Deviation First Difference 
  DLOAN DLOAN DLOAN DLOAN DLOAN DLOAN 
Expl. Variables       
DLOAN(-1) 0.02423** 0.03274*** 0.0201** 0.0200* 0.0240 0.0338** 
 (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.016) (0.014) 
DISC -3.33802*** -3.50177*** -1.5235** -1.7412*** -3.1842*** -3.5834*** 
 (0.621) (0.607) (0.604) (0.551) (0.640) (0.863) 
NDISC -2.89965** -1.8617* -0.4352 2.6824 -1.2868 -3.4193 
 (1.607) (1.553) (1.908) (1.918) (1.663) (1.929) 
EQTA 0.32321*** 0.32320*** 0.3159*** 0.2997*** 0.0652 0.0918 
 (0.071) (0.065) (0.098) (0.086) (0.062) (0.072) 
DDEPO 0.48197*** 0.46161*** 0.4842*** 0.4747*** 0.4840*** 0.4592*** 
 (0.024) (0.026) (0.031) (0.034) (0.034) (0.038) 
GDPG 0.30149*** 0.29873*** 0.1226** 0.1773*** 0.5785*** 0.7445*** 
 (0.062) (0.064) (0.055) (0.056) (0.144) (0.153) 
LRATE -0.00242*** -0.00264*** -0.0012* -0.0019** -0.0047*** -0.0046*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
INF 0.12965*** 0.16954*** 0.1031** 0.1190*** 0.1933*** 0.2416*** 
 (0.043) (0.042) (0.041) (0.042) (0.074) (0.082) 
CR3 0.05094*** 0.05791*** 0.0493*** 0.0521** 0.0677** 0.09244*** 
 (0.01476) (0.0158) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
CR3*NDISC 2.90551 1.06233 -1.3592* -6.4913** 2.2372 3.5928 
 (2.757) (2.717) (3.649) (3.799) (2.620) (3.011) 
       
p-value for AR(2) test 0.096 0.109 0.201 0.193 0.217 0.214 
p-value for Hansen-J test 0.992 0.997 0.912 0.897 0.956 0.966 
Observations 2,496 2,496 1,610 1,610 886 886 
Number of banks 494 494 261 261 233 233 
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Table 5. The role of economic development on the link between non-discretionary provisions and loan growth of banks.  The definition of variables 
follows the one presented in Table 1. DLOAN(-1) is the one-year lagged value of DLOAN. DISC and NDISC is discretionary and non-discretionary provisions, 
respectively, which are estimated with respect to the method of transformations of instruments used: Orthogonal Deviations or First Difference. The estimations 
are conducted using the two-step Generalized Method of Moments estimators. The models are valid if the AR(2) test and Hansen-J test are both insignificant. 
  All Banks Large Banks Small Banks 
 Orthogonal Deviation First Difference Orthogonal Deviation First Difference Orthogonal Deviation First Difference 
  DLOAN DLOAN DLOAN DLOAN DLOAN DLOAN 
Expl. Variables       
DLOAN(-1) 0.0241*** 0.03521*** 0.0162** 0.0193** 0.0316 0.0356*** 
 (0.00861) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.038) (0.013) 
DISC -3.060*** -3.29679*** -1.3662** -1.5080*** -3.2897*** -2.9680*** 
 (0.575) (0.581) (0.556) (0.494) (0.998) (0.876) 
NDISC -0.856* -1.13834* -1.5112*** -1.2990** 0.4329 -1.1494 
 (0.490) (0.582) (0.523) (0.608) (0.626) (0.749) 
EQTA 0.394*** 0.40039*** 0.4054*** 0.4018*** 0.1960** 0.2172*** 
 (0.0717) (0.067) (0.106) (0.096) (0.095) (0.076) 
DDEPO 0.497*** 0.47644*** 0.4995*** 0.4842*** 0.5093*** 0.4745*** 
 (0.0231) (0.025) (0.031) (0.032) (0.070) (0.036) 
GDPG 0.440*** 0.44065*** 0.2163*** 0.2826*** 0.6250** 0.8920*** 
 (0.0593) (0.060) (0.058) (0.062) (0.306) (0.154) 
LRATE -0.00187*** -0.00178*** -0.0005 -0.0008 -0.0036 -0.0032*** 
 (0.000539) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.006) (0.001) 
INF 0.181*** 0.24349*** 0.1320*** 0.1588*** 0.2169 0.3200*** 
 (0.0445) (0.045) (0.041) (0.041) (0.586) (0.086) 
GDPCAP -0.000122 -4.78e-07 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 
 (9.99e-05) (4.08e-07) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
GDPCAP*NDISC -4.75e-07 -8.80e-05 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0001 -0.0002 
 (5.18e-07) (8.09e-05) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
       
p-value for AR(2) test 0.093 0.106 0.259 0.293 0.212 0.178 
p-value for Hansen-J test 0.988 0.989 1.000 1.000 0.977 0.982 
Observations 2,634 2,634 1,689 1,689 945 945 




Table 6. The role of rule of law on the link between non-discretionary provisions and loan growth of banks.  The definition of variables follows the one 
presented in Table 1. DLOAN(-1) is the one-year lagged value of DLOAN. DISC and NDISC is discretionary and non-discretionary provisions, respectively, 
which are estimated with respect to the method of transformations of instruments used: Orthogonal Deviations or First Difference. The estimations are conducted 
using the two-step Generalized Method of Moments estimators. The models are valid if the AR(2) test and Hansen-J test are both insignificant. 
  All Banks Large Banks Small Banks 
 Orthogonal Deviation First Difference Orthogonal Deviation First Difference Orthogonal Deviation First Difference 
  DLOAN DLOAN DLOAN DLOAN DLOAN DLOAN 
Expl. Variables       
DLOAN(-1) 0.0268*** 0.0369*** 0.0199** 0.0228** 0.0345** 0.0460*** 
 (0.00894) (0.00859) (0.009) (0.00985) (0.0149) (0.0145) 
DISC -3.279*** -3.374*** -1.5441*** -1.483*** -3.268*** -3.568*** 
 (0.620) (0.605) (0.584) (0.525) (0.646) (0.868) 
NDISC -1.231** -1.117* -1.1337*** -0.703 1.234 -0.782 
 (0.500) (0.601) (0.431) (0.465) (0.886) (0.859) 
EQTA 0.386*** 0.379*** 0.3822*** 0.346*** 0.179*** 0.225*** 
 (0.0747) (0.0678) (0.096) (0.0858) (0.0626) (0.0753) 
DDEPO 0.495*** 0.478*** 0.4929*** 0.485*** 0.510*** 0.489*** 
 (0.0231) (0.0251) (0.029) (0.0321) (0.0335) (0.0362) 
GDPG 0.393*** 0.404*** 0.2094*** 0.277*** 0.416** 0.679*** 
 (0.0588) (0.0627) (0.055) (0.0591) (0.161) (0.156) 
LRATE -0.00163*** -0.00168*** -0.0005 -0.000971* -0.00413*** -0.00318*** 
 (0.000543) (0.000524) (0.001) (0.000576) (0.00105) (0.000914) 
INF 0.175*** 0.233*** 0.1339*** 0.174*** 0.220*** 0.279*** 
 (0.0480) (0.0488) (0.041) (0.0461) (0.0809) (0.0865) 
RLAW -0.00586 -0.00675 -0.0007 0.00232 -0.0479** -0.0312** 
 (0.00614) (0.00563) (0.004) (0.00500) (0.0220) (0.0143) 
RLAW*NDISC -0.125 0.407 -0.1806 0.243 2.340* 0.969 
 (0.742) (0.779) (0.546) (0.633) (1.376) (1.289) 
       
p-value for AR(2) test 0.088 0.116 0.268 0.293 0.345 0.270 
p-value for Hansen-J test 0.996 0.991 0.995 0.988 0.979 0.984 
Observations 2,634 2,634 1,689 1,689 945 945 
Number of banks 498 498 264 264 234 234 
 
